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Abstract
This paper studies the innovation dynamics of an oligopolistic in-
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Rent sharing may generate productivity dependent wage differentials.
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fect the incentives for innovation at subsequent dates. Over time the
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structure on the adjustment path.
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1 Introduction
The relationship between wages and productivity growth has attracted a lot
of attention in economic theory. According to the traditional view in growth
theory, the causality runs from productivity growth to wage growth, with
higher productivity leading to higher wages. This relation is based on the
argument that “the marginal productivity equation determines the time path
of the real wage” (Solow (1956), p. 68).
In this paper, we reverse the causality between wages and productivity
growth and examine the impact of wages on firms’ productivity enhancing
innovation investments in an oligopolistic industry. In particular, this paper
studies the short– and the long–run evolution of productivity growth in an
oligopolistic industry in which firms produce a homogeneous good, entry
and exit are free and the time horizon is infinite. In each period, firms
enter the market, they invest in capacity and in labor productivity enhancing
innovation, and they compete in quantities in the following period. The
competitive wage in the economy is exogenous. Yet, each firm’s specific
wage is determined through bargaining with its employees. This allows us
to investigate the effect of unionization on the industry’s equilibrium path.
Firms have free access to the last period’s best production technology and
their current innovation investments affect their labor cost at the subsequent
date, and thus, the future innovation incentives. This process generates the
industry’s dynamics.
We demonstrate that in the short–run, the higher is the industry’s com-
petitive wage, and thus, the higher is the labor cost, the higher are firms’
investments in labor productivity enhancing innovation. Intuitively, when
labor is costly, firms have stronger incentives to substitute against it, i.e.,
to use less labor by increasing the productivity of labor. In the long–run,
there is a unique steady state. In the steady state, firm’s unit labor costs
are constant over time and firm’s investments in productivity enhancing in-
novation are equal to the growth rate of the industry’s competitive wage. In
the steady state also, the number of firms that enter in the market in each
period, the output and the unit labor cost of each active firm depend only
on the growth rate of the industry’s competitive wage and not on the level of
the competitive wage. But the level of wages is important for the industry’s
adjustment path towards the steady state. On this path, the number and
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size of firms and their innovation activities depend on the level of their labor
cost. An increase in the employees’ bargaining power reduces the innovation
rate, and thus, slows down the speed of adjustment towards the steady state.
In contrast, the impact of unionization on the number and size of firms is
ambiguous outside the steady state.
This paper complements the analysis of Bester and Petrakis (2003, 2004)
who examine the relation between wages and productivity growth in a per-
fectly competitive and a monopolistic industry, respectively. It extends their
models to an imperfectly competitive market structure where the firms in-
teract strategically in their capacity and innovation decisions. In contrast
with the case of perfect competition, in this paper the firms’ wage rate is not
necessarily identical to the competitive economy–wide wage. Instead, it de-
pends on how unionization and wage bargaining affect the sharing of surplus
between firms and their employees. As a result, unionization can have an
impact on the endogenous variables of the industry both on the adjustment
path and in the steady state. In contrast with the monopoly case, the num-
ber of active firms is endogenous in this paper, because there is free entry
and exit. This also implies that the rate of innovation and the competitive-
ness of the industry are simultaneously determined on the equilibrium path.
Indeed, free entry and exit have a profound impact on the firms’ innovation
decisions: Whereas in Bester and Petrakis (2004) the monopolist has the
highest innovation incentive for some intermediate range of unit labor cost,
the present model leads to a monotone relation between these variables.
As a variation of our analysis of a homogenous market, in an appendix of
this paper we adopt a demand specification based on Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)
that reflects a preference for product variety. This allows us to confirm the
robustness of our main findings on the industry’s long–run dynamics, as well
as to examine the role of product differentiation. Regarding the latter, we
find that industries characterized by stronger product differentiation tend to
have a larger number of smaller and less efficient firms than industries with
less differentiated products.
A number of empirical studies support our argument that labor market
conditions affect productivity growth. In a recent paper, Dew–Becker and
Gordon (2008) have demonstrated that changes in labour market policies,
and thus, in the labour market conditions can explain the behavior of the
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EU’s productivity growth after 1995, as well as the differences in the pro-
ductivity growth’s trends in the EU and the US. Moreover, Gordon (1987,
2000) has found that the behavior of the ratio of wages to labor productivity
plays a crucial role in explaining the trends of macroeconomic productivity
growth in the US, Japan and Europe. Similar findings at the industry level
are presented in Flaig and Stadler (1994), Doms et al. (1997), and Chennells
and Van Reenen (1997).
Examining the interaction between unionization and firms’ innovation
activities, we find that wage bargaining reduces firms’ short–run incentives to
invest in productivity enhancing innovation. Intuitively, rent sharing between
the employees and the firms leads to the standard hold up problem in labor
markets. This observation is in line with the findings of Baldwin (1983),
Grout (1984) and van der Ploeg (1987) who demonstrate that due to the
hold up problem, firms’ investments decrease with the employees’ bargaining
power.1 Interestingly, things change in the long–run. In particular, wage
bargaining does not affect the growth rate of the industry’s competitive wage.
Given that in the long–run firms’ investments are equal to the latter, it follows
that unionization does not influence firms’ long–run innovation incentives and
productivity growth.2 Nevertheless, higher union bargaining power means
fewer firms and higher output per firm in the steady state, i.e. a more
concentrated market with less efficient firms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
our model. In Section 3, we derive the equilibrium for a given state of
the environment. The firms’ innovation decisions change the state of the
environment over time. The steady state of this process is studied in Section
4. In Section 5, we show that the industry monotonically approaches the
steady state and describe the industry’s dynamics on its adjustment path.
We conclude in Section 6. The proofs of all formal results are relegated
to Appendix A. In Appendix B we extend our steady state analysis to an
1See Malcomson (1997) for an overview. Tauman and Weiss (1987) and Ulph and Ulph
(1994, 1998, 2001) consider different environments, with asymmetric firms and a patent
race respectively; they find that unionization can lead to overinvestment in innovation.
2Note that the empirical evidence on the relation between unionization and innovation
is mixed (see e.g., Hirsh and Link (1984), Connolly et al. (1986), Acs and Audretsch
(1987a&b), Machin and Wadhwani (1991), Menezes-Filho et al. (1998)). For a review of
the empirical literature see Flanagan (1999).
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alternative specification of demand by considering Dixit–Stiglitz preferences.
2 The Model
We consider an oligopolistic industry in which firms produce a homogeneous
product and entry and exit are free. The market demand is given by:
p = d−X, (1)
where p is the product’s price, X is the aggregate output of all firms. For
simplicity, we assume that the demand function (1) is stationary over time.
Accordingly, demand does not change with the growth of incomes.3 We
further assume that d, which captures the size of demand, is large enough so
that entering the market is always profitable for a positive number of firms.
Time is discrete, it is denoted by t, with t = 0, 1, 2, ..., and the horizon
is infinite. At date t, all firms have access to the best available current
technology, which is described by its level of labor productivity, at. This
implies that all firms that enter in the market at date t are identical. However,
to produce output xit at date t + 1, each firm i, with i = 1, 2, ..., nt, must
invest in capacity kxit at date t; that is, the unit cost of capacity investments
is k > 0. Further, at date t, each firm i can invest in process innovation,
qit, in order to increase its labor productivity from at to at(1 + qit) at date
t+ 1. The cost of the process innovation investments is given by K(q), with
K(0) = K ′(0) = K ′′(0) = 0, and K ′(q) > 0, K ′′(q) > 0 for all q > 0. We also
assume that K(·) satisfies the following inequality:
K ′′(q) ≥
K ′(q)2
2K(q)
. (2)
This condition requires that the innovation cost K(·) is sufficiently convex.
It is satisfied, for instance, when K(q) = µ qm, with m ≥ 2 and µ > 0. As
a consequence, at date t + 1, each firm i produces its output xit by hiring
xit/[at(1 + qit)] units of labor. It is important to note that the industry
dynamics are generated by the firms’ innovation behavior. This determines
3This could be justified by assuming that the demand function is derived from a stan-
dard quasi-linear utility function in which wealth effects are absent.
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the best available in the industry technology and the incentives for further
innovation in the subsequent period.
We assume that the competitive wage rate of labor is exogenously given
as w¯t at date t. We also assume that at the following date, date t + 1, the
competitive wage becomes:
w¯t+1 = w¯t (1 + γ), γ > 0, (3)
where γ is the growth rate of the competitive wage. One could think of γ
as the rate of average productivity growth and wage growth in the entire
economy. This means that the industry under consideration constitutes a
tiny part of the whole economy, and thus, its impact on the growth of w¯t is
negligible. In what follows we define the competitive wage per efficiency unit
of labor at date t,
ct ≡
w¯t
at
, (4)
and consider it as the industry’s state variable at the beginning of date t.
From (3), (4) and the result of the process innovation investments, it follows
that the competitive wage per efficiency unit of labor that firm i faces at
date t+ 1 is:
w¯t+1
at(1 + qit)
=
w¯t(1 + γ)
at(1 + qit)
=
1 + γ
1 + qit
ct. (5)
Firm i’s specific wage rate at date t+ 1 may differ from the competitive
wage as it may be positively related to the firm’s labor productivity enhance-
ment due to the firm’s innovation activities at date t. The latter activities
generate quasi-rents over which the employees of the firm have a ‘stake’ -
this is the well-known hold-up problem. Such productivity dependent wage
differentials reflect the employees’ bargaining power within the firm. The
firm i’s specific wage is determined through bargaining between the firm and
its employees at the beginning of date t + 1, i.e. just before production.
In particular, since at the previous date t firm i’s output and process in-
novation investments have been determined, the employment level is fixed
during the wage negotiations. Therefore, the only variable at stake during
the negotiations is the surplus per unit of firm i’s output given by:
pt+1 − k −
w¯t+1
at(1 + qit)
. (6)
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Clearly, firm i would prefer to pay the minimum possible wage, i.e. the com-
petitive wage w¯t+1, and retain for itself the whole surplus. On the other hand,
firm i’s employees would prefer to set the wage equal to (pt+1 − k)at(1 + qit)
so that they are the ones who capture the whole surplus. As a consequence,
the firm i’s specific wage is expected to be a weighted average of the two bar-
gaining parties most preferred wages, with weights equal to their respective
bargaining powers. Assuming that the employees’ bargaining power is given
by r, with 0 ≤ r < 1, it follows that firm i’s specific wage rate at date t+ 1
is:
(1− r)w¯t+1 + r(pt+1 − k)at(1 + qit). (7)
Therefore, by (3) and (5), firm i’s labor cost per unit of output is
(1− r) ct
1 + γ
1 + qit
+ r(pt+1 − k). (8)
Firm i’s profits upon entry at date t are thus given by:4
(1− r)
[
d− xit −
∑
j 6=i
xjt − k − ct
1 + γ
1 + qit
]
xit −K(qit). (9)
3 Static Equilibrium
In this section, we obtain the static equilibrium when the state of the industry
at date t is given by ct.
Upon entry at date t, firm i chooses xit and qit in order to maximize its
profits (9). In a symmetric Nash equilibrium, all active firms produce the
same quantity x∗t and have the same innovation rate q
∗
t . Keeping this in mind,
it follows from the first order conditions of firms i’s maximization problem
that x∗t and q
∗
t are determined by:
5
x∗t =
1
1 + nt
[
d− k − ct
1 + γ
1 + q∗t
]
, (10)
4Note that we assume that firms do not discount future profits. This assumption is
without loss of generality. If the firm discounts its future profits by a factor 0 < δ < 1,
the analysis goes through by simply redefining kδ ≡ k/δ and Kδ(q) ≡ K(q)/δ.
5One can show that the first order conditions are sufficient if [K(q)(1 + q)]′′ ≥ (1 −
r)[ct (1 + γ)]
2/2.
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and
(1− r)ct(1 + γ)
1 + nt
[
d− k − ct
1 + γ
1 + q∗t
]
= K ′(q∗t )(1 + q
∗
t )
2. (11)
Substituting (10) into (9), firm i’s profits at date t can be rewritten as:
(1− r)
(1 + nt)2
[
d− k − ct
1 + γ
1 + q∗t
]2
−K(q∗t ). (12)
Due to free entry and exit, firm i’s profits (12) have to be zero.6 Using
(11) and setting (12) equal to zero, we can determine the equilibrium values
of n∗t and q
∗
t for a given ct. More specifically, in order to derive the equilibrium
innovation rate q∗t , we define the following function:
ϕI(q) ≡
K ′(q)2 (1 + q)4
K(q)
. (13)
By Lemma 1 in the Appendix, ϕI(q) is strictly increasing in q. Moreover, our
assumptions on K(·) ensure that limq→0 ϕI(q) = 0 and limq→∞ ϕI(q) = ∞.
This is so, because by L’ Hospital rule limq→0[K
′(q)2/K(q)] = limq→0[2K
′′(q)]
= 0 and similarly for q →∞.
Combining (11) with the zero profit condition resulting from (12), we get:
(1− r)[ ct(1 + γ)]
2 = ϕI(q
∗
t ). (14)
The properties of ϕI(·) imply the following results.
Proposition 1 For a given value of the state variable ct, there is a unique
equilibrium innovation rate q∗t . Moreover, q
∗
t is:
(i) strictly increasing in ct and γ,
(ii) strictly decreasing in r,
(iii) independent of d− k.
According to Proposition 1(i), the competitive wage growth γ stimulates
firm’s productivity enhancing innovation. As can be seen from (11), each firm
chooses its innovation rate so that its marginal benefit from the higher labor
productivity tomorrow equals the marginal cost of its innovation investments
today. A higher γ means higher unit labor cost for the firm (see (8)). This
also holds when the competitive wage per efficiency unit of labor at date t, ct,
6As usual, we ignore the problem that nt should be an integer number.
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becomes higher. Under these circumstances, a firm has stronger incentives
to use less labor and it does so by enhancing its labor productivity, i.e. by
investing more in process innovation.
Proposition 1(ii) asserts that firm’s productivity enhancing investments
are negatively related to the employees’ bargaining power r. This is an
immediate consequence of the hold up problem. Clearly, an increase in the
employees’ bargaining power leads to an increase in the employees’ share of
the quasi rents generated by innovation and a decrease in the respective firm’s
share. As the firm enjoys a smaller share of the outcome of its investments,
it has weaker incentives to invest.
According to Proposition 1(iii), the market size, as captured by d−k, has
no impact on firm’s innovation investments. This is so because the marginal
benefit of the innovation investments is proportional to the equilibrium out-
put of each firm. As we will see later on, the latter is independent of the
market size, and thus, the equilibrium innovation investments are also inde-
pendent of the market size.
Having determined the relation between ct and q
∗
t , we use the zero profit
condition to derive the number n∗t of firms that are active in the market in
state ct.
Proposition 2 For a given value of the state variable ct, there is a unique
equilibrium number n∗t of active firms. Moreover, n
∗
t is:
(i) strictly decreasing in ct and γ,
(ii) strictly increasing in d− k.
Proposition 2 states that there is a negative relationship between the
number of firms that enter in the market in equilibrium n∗t and the com-
petitive wage per efficiency unit of labor ct. As mentioned above, higher ct
means higher unit labor cost. The latter translates into lower efficiency for
the firm, and thus, into a lower profit margin. Since the profit margin is low,
fewer firms are willing to enter in the market. A similar reasoning applies for
an increase in the competitive wage growth γ.
Proposition 2 also states that when the market size increases, there are
stronger entry incentives. The intuition is straightforward. The bigger is the
size of the market, the more space there is in the market for firms to enter.
Equation (10) allows us to determine each firm’s equilibrium output x∗t .
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Proposition 3 For a given value of the state variable ct, there is a unique
equilibrium output x∗t for each firm. Moreover, x
∗
t is:
(i) strictly increasing in ct and γ,
(ii) independent of d− k.
According to Proposition 3(i), the higher is the competitive wage per effi-
ciency unit of labor ct, the higher is each firm’s output x
∗
t . The intuition is as
follows. We know from Proposition 1(i) that higher ct leads to higher q
∗
t . We
also know that firm’s output and innovation investments are complements.
This holds because when output increases the marginal benefit of innovation
also increases (“output effect”). As a consequence, since q∗t increases with ct,
x∗t also increases with ct.
As we saw in Proposition 2(ii), when the market size d− k increases, the
equilibrium number of entering firms n∗t increases, and thus, each firm tends
to be smaller. Yet, an increase in the market size, increases each firm’s profit
margin which tends to increase its equilibrium output. These two effects
cancel out each other. As a consequence, firm’s equilibrium output turns out
to be independent of the market size (Proposition 3(ii)).
We know from Proposition 1(ii) that an increase in the employees’ bar-
gaining power has a negative impact on firm’s investments in labor produc-
tivity enhancing innovation. Similarly, one might wonder about the impact
of the employees’ bargaining power on the equilibrium number of entering
firms, as well as on the equilibrium output of each firm. An increase in the
employees’ power r has two opposite effects on firms’ entry incentives. First,
it leads to a decrease in firm’s innovation (Proposition 1(i)), and thus, to a
decrease in the “entry costs” K(q∗t ). Second, it leads to an increase in the
firm’s unit labor costs. The latter, together with the decrease in the share
of the quasi rents 1 − r that a firm enjoys, translate into lower firm’s gross
profits and they lead, in turn, to a decrease in firm’s entry incentives. As
a consequence, the equilibrium number of firms might increase or decrease
with r.
Setting K(q) = q2 and using numerical simulations we find that when
the competitive wage per efficiency unit of labor ct is low, the stronger is
the employees’ bargaining power, the more firms enter into the industry.
Instead, when ct is sufficiently high, an increase in the employees’ bargaining
power can discourage firms’ entry. Regarding the impact of the employees’
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bargaining power r on firm’s equilibrium output, our numerical simulations
indicate that an increase in r discourages firm’s production when ct is low,
while it can encourage it when ct is high and r is sufficiently low. The
respective impact of an increase in r on the aggregate output n∗tx
∗
t is instead
always negative.
4 Steady State Equilibrium
We now turn to the study of the long–run dynamics of the industry. In
particular, in this section we study the existence, the uniqueness and the
properties of the steady state. In the subsequent section, we investigate the
industry’s adjustment path towards the steady state.
A firm that at date t enters the market and invests in process innovation,
has a one–period monopoly over its productivity improvement in the follow-
ing date t+1. A firm instead that enters at date t+1, has access to the most
advanced technology that has been developed at the previous date t, and
it can further improve upon this technology by investing in innovation that
it will use in order to produce its output at date t + 2. Clearly, this means
that current innovations generate spillover effects on the starting point of
future innovations. This process determines the evolution of the industry’s
state variable ct and, therefore, also the intertemporal equilibrium path of
the variables n∗t , q
∗
t and x
∗
t that, as we saw in the static equilibrium, depend
on ct.
We infer from (4), (5) and the symmetry of the static equilibrium that
at date t + 1, the industry’s state ct+1 depends on the state of the previous
date ct according to:
ct+1 =
1 + γ
1 + q∗t
ct. (15)
Since q∗t is determined by ct, it follows that equation (15) describes the evo-
lution of ct over time for any given initial value c0. What happens in a steady
state? In a steady state, the variable ct remains constant at some value over
time, ct = cˆ. Accordingly, the variables n
∗
t , q
∗
t and x
∗
t also remain constant
over time, n∗t = nˆ, q
∗
t = qˆ and x
∗
t = xˆ.
From ct+1 = ct = cˆ and (15) follows immediately that the state variable
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is in a steady state cˆ > 0 if and only if
q∗t = qˆ = γ (16)
for all t. This means that in a steady state, the industry’s rate of productivity
growth q∗t equals the growth rate of the competitive wage γ. Note that if,
according to our previous discussion, the competitive wage reflects average
productivity growth in the rest of the economy, then in turn the condition
for the existence of a steady state (16) means that the industry’s innovation
performance is identical to the average performance of all other industries.
Note also that in a steady state the firm–specific wage, as specified in
(7), increases at the same rate as the competitive wage. This means that
the relative wage differential remains constant over time. Further, by (8),
the firms’ unit labor cost is stationary in a steady state, and it is given by
cˆ+ r(d− nˆxˆ− k − cˆ). In other words, the firm’s unit labor cost exceeds the
steady state competitive wage per efficiency unit of labor cˆ by an amount
which is proportional to its employees’ power and to the industry’s steady
state profits margin. Using (16), the equilibrium conditions (11) and (12) in
a steady state are:
(1− r) cˆ
1 + nˆ
(d− k − cˆ) = K ′(γ)(1 + γ), (17)
and
(1− r)
(1 + nˆ)2
[d− k − cˆ]2 = K(γ). (18)
Conditions (17) and (18) determine the steady state values cˆ and nˆ. The
output of each firm xˆ in the steady state can be derived from equation (10)
by using cˆ, nˆ, and (16).
To study the industry’s steady state equilibrium, we define the function
ϕII(q) ≡
K ′(q)2 (1 + q)2
K(q)
. (19)
By Lemma 1 in the Appendix, ϕII(q) is strictly increasing in q.Moreover, our
assumptions on K(·) ensure that limq→0 ϕII(q) = 0 and limq→∞ ϕII(q) =∞,
for the same reasons as for the case of ϕI(q).
The combination of (17) and (18) shows that cˆ is the solution of the
equation
(1− r)cˆ2 = ϕII(γ). (20)
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In the remainder of this section we show that the steady state equilibrium
is unique and discuss its properties.7
Proposition 4 For a given value of γ, the steady state value cˆ of the indus-
try’s state variable is unique. Moreover, cˆ is:
(i) strictly increasing in γ,
(ii) strictly increasing in r,
(iii) independent of d− k.
As stated in Proposition 4(i), a higher competitive wage growth leads to
a higher competitive wage per efficiency unit of labor at the steady state.
Intuitively, since in the steady state qˆ = γ, an increase in the rate of the
competitive wage growth is countervailed by an increase in each firm’s in-
novation investments. For the latter to occur though, the competitive wage
per efficiency unit of labor should be higher in the steady state (see Propo-
sition 1(i)). In other words, a higher competitive wage growth rate can be
supported in the steady state only if higher unit labor costs force firms to
increase their innovation investments.
Regarding the impact of the employees’ bargaining power on the compet-
itive wage per efficiency unit of labor in the steady state, Proposition 4(ii)
tells us that it is positive. The intuition is as follows. By Proposition 1(ii)
we know that the higher is the employees’ power, the lower are the firms’
innovation investments. However, in the steady state firms’ investments are
constant over time. Therefore, for an increase in the employees’ power not to
lead to a decrease in the innovation investments, there must be an opposite
force in action. This is, in fact, an increase in the competitive wage per
efficiency unit of labor that, in contrast to the employees’ power, reinforces
firms’ innovation incentives (Proposition 1(i)). Interestingly, an increase in
the employees’ power has no impact on the firms’ investment incentives in
the steady state. The latter are determined exclusively by the exogenous
competitive wage growth. This implies that there is no hold-up problem in
the industry’s steady state. Nevertheless, the higher employees’ power im-
plies that the active firms face less favorable production conditions, i.e. their
unit labor cost is higher.
7Note that a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a steady state
equilibrium is that γ is not too large. In particular, γ should be such that φII(γ) <
(1− r)(d− k)2. Otherwise, the equilibrium quantity becomes negative.
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Finally, since we know from Proposition 1(iii) that the firms’ innovation
incentives are independent of the market size, it follows that, as stated in
Proposition 4(iii), the competitive wage per efficiency unit of labor is also
independent of the market size.
The solution cˆ of (20) allows us to derive the number nˆ of active firms.
Proposition 5 For a given value of γ, there is a unique steady state number
nˆ of active firms in the industry. Moreover, nˆ is:
(i) strictly decreasing in γ,
(ii) strictly decreasing in r,
(iii) strictly increasing in d− k.
We know from Proposition 2(i) that when the competitive wage per ef-
ficiency unit of labor increases, the equilibrium number of entering firms
decreases. We also know from Proposition 4(i) that the competitive wage
growth rate is positively related to the competitive wage per efficiency unit
of labor in the steady state. Combining these two, it follows that, as stated
in Proposition 5(i), an increase in the competitive wage growth rate leads to
a decrease in the steady state number of firms.
How does the employees’ power influence the number of active firms in
the steady state? We saw in Proposition 4(ii) that an increase in the em-
ployees’ power has a positive impact on the competitive wage per efficiency
unit of labor. We also saw in Proposition 2(i) that the latter has a negative
impact on the number of entering firms. As a consequence, when the em-
ployees’ bargaining power is increased, firms have weaker incentives to enter
the market. Finally, and as expected, an increase in the market size offers
stronger market entry incentives (Proposition 5(iii)).
The solution cˆ of (20) together with (18) and (10) determines the output
xˆ of each firm.
Proposition 6 For a given value of γ, there is a unique steady state output
xˆ for each firm. Moreover, xˆ is:
(i) strictly increasing in γ,
(ii) strictly increasing in r,
(iii) independent of d− k.
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According to Proposition 6(i), an increase in the competitive wage growth
rate has a positive impact on each firm’s equilibrium output. Intuitively, an
increase in the competitive wage growth rate leads to an increase in the
competitive wage per efficiency unit of labor (Proposition 4(i)). An increase
though in the latter, as we know from Proposition 3(i), leads to an increase
in the equilibrium output of each firm. Thus, γ and xˆ move in the same
direction. Similarly, as stated in Proposition 6(ii), r and xˆ move in the same
direction. The intuition for the latter result is a straightforward implication
of Propositions 4(ii) and 3(i). Finally, as in the static equilibrium, in the
steady state too, each firm’s output is independent of the market size d− k.
Combining Propositions 5 and 6, we end up with the following implica-
tions. First, a higher competitive wage growth rate is expected to lead to
industries with a smaller number of larger firms. Second, industries in which
employees have strong power are expected to be more concentrated, i.e. have
fewer and larger firms, than industries with weak employees’ power.
5 Equilibrium Dynamics
We now show that the steady state, studied in the previous section, indeed
describes the long–run industry equilibrium, i.e. we show that for any initial
value c0, the industry’s state variable monotonically approaches the steady
state value cˆ over time. Obviously, this implies that the equilibrium variables
(n∗t , q
∗
t , x
∗
t ) tend towards (nˆ, qˆ, xˆ) in the limit as t→∞.
The evolution of ct is given by equation (15), where q
∗
t is the industry’s
equilibrium innovation rate at date t in state ct. Thus, (15) represents a
first–order difference equation. Its solution has the following property:
Proposition 7 The state variable ct monotonically approaches cˆ over time.
That is, {ct}
∞
t=0 is a monotone sequence with limt→∞ ct = cˆ.
Proposition 7 implies that, since the state variable ct approaches its steady
state value cˆ monotonically, it increases over time if the initial state c0 lies
below cˆ; while it decreases over time if c0 > cˆ. In other words, the industry’s
competitive wage per efficiency unit of labor is decreasing over time when,
for given w0, the level of labor productivity in the industry is initially low (a0
low). The opposite is true when a0 is high, in which case we expect to observe
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ct to be increasing over time. Furthermore, the industry’s labor cost per unit
of output is expected to exhibit a similar behavior to ct. That is, the industry
becomes increasingly more efficient when its initial labor productivity is low;
and vice versa.
Propositions 1, 2 and 3, therefore, allow us to characterize the industry’s
behavior on its adjustment path:
Proposition 8 If c0 < cˆ, then on the equilibrium path q
∗
t and x
∗
t are in-
creasing over time while n∗t is decreasing over time. Moreover, total industry
output X∗t = n
∗
tx
∗
t is decreasing over time. Conversely, q
∗
t and x
∗
t are de-
creasing while n∗t and X
∗
t are increasing over time if c0 > cˆ.
According to Proposition 8, depending on the initial state of the indus-
try, labor productivity growth either increases, or decreases continuously over
time. In particular, when the industry’s initial labor productivity a0 is high
(for given w0), firms invest increasingly more over time in innovation, and
thus, there is acceleration in productivity growth. When instead the indus-
try’s initial productivity is low, the opposite occurs. Moreover, Proposition 8
states that changes in the labor productivity growth are positively related to
changes in the size of firms and negatively related to changes in the number of
firms and the aggregate industry output. Therefore, when initial labor pro-
ductivity is low, the industry becomes increasingly less concentrated through
entry of new firms and a decrease in the size of the existing firms; moreover,
the aggregate industry output expands over time. In contrast, when the
initial labor productivity is high, the industry becomes increasingly more
concentrated through the exit of firms and the increase in the size of the
active firms, while its aggregate output shrinks over time.
The above results have a number of empirically testable implications for
the industry’s adjustment following a change in exogenous parameters. First,
an increase in the employees’ bargaining power is expected to lead to a pat-
tern of exit of firms and an increased concentration in an industry that has
already reached its steady state. Second, a similar pattern is expected to
occur when the growth rate of the competitive wage becomes higher. In
contrast, a decrease in the employees’ power or the competitive wage growth
rate should be followed by entry of new firms in the industry and a downside
of the size of the existing firms. Finally, a change in the market size is not
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expected to have a significant impact on industry dynamics, since it should
be accommodated by the entry of a number of new firms of similar size to
the existing ones.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have shown that the labor market characteristics can play a crucial role
in our understanding of the innovative performance, as well as of the pro-
ductivity of different industries and countries.
We have considered an imperfectly competitive market in a partial equi-
librium model which is based on a cost–push argument of innovation. Firms
react by innovating to increases in the exogenous economy–wide wage rate.
But also wage bargaining at the firm level influences their innovation deci-
sion. We have shown that unionization lowers the incentives for innovation
in the short–run. But, perhaps surprisingly, long–run productivity growth in
the steady state is independent of wage bargaining.
Our findings give rise to a number of interesting empirically testable im-
plications. An increase in the growth rate of the competitive wage is expected
to lead to a more concentrated industry, i.e. fewer and larger firms, and to
a pattern of exit of firms in an industry that has already reached its steady
state. A similar pattern is more likely to be observed in industries in which
employees have strong bargaining power than in industries with weak em-
ployees’ power.
An interesting extension of this paper would be to embed the analysis
in a general equilibrium model, in which the economy–wide wage rate is en-
dogenous. In such a model, aggregate productivity growth in all industries
of the economy would determine the path of real wages. Hellwig and Irmen
(2001) present a model of this type; but they assume all industries to be
perfectly competitive. By extending their model along the lines of this pa-
per, one might address the question of how imperfect competition and wage
bargaining affect productivity growth not only in a single industry but also
in the entire economy.
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7 Appendix A: Proofs of Propositions 1–8
This appendix contains the proofs of Propositions 1–8. We begin with the
following auxiliary Lemma.
Lemma 1 By condition (2), ϕI(q) in (13) and ϕII(q) in (19) are strictly
increasing in q.
Proof: The functions ϕI(·) and ϕII(·) are certainly strictly increasing in q if
K ′(q)2
K(q)
(21)
is non-decreasing in q. This is the case if and only if
2K ′′(q)K(q)−K ′(q)2 ≥ 0. (22)
By condition (2), 2K ′′(q)K(q) ≥ K ′(q)2. This implies that (22) is satisfied.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: Results (i)–(iii) immediately follow from (14) and
the properties of ϕI(·) stated in Lemma 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Propositions 2 and 3: We first show that in equilibrium
ct
1 + γ
1 + q∗t
(23)
is strictly increasing in ct. Indeed, by (14) we have
(1− r)
[
ct
1 + γ
1 + q∗t
]2
=
K ′(q∗t )
2(1 + q∗t )
2
K(q∗t )
. (24)
The r.h.s. of this equation is strictly increasing in q∗t because the proof of
Lemma 1 shows that K ′(q)2/K(q) is non-decreasing in q. By Proposition 1,
q∗t is strictly increasing in ct and so the r.h.s. of (24) is strictly increasing in
ct. It thus follows from (24) that the term in (23) is strictly increasing in ct.
Now consider the zero profit condition
(1− r)
(1 + n∗t )
2
[
d− k − ct
1 + γ
1 + q∗t
]2
= K(q∗t ). (25)
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As we have just shown, the term in the bracket of the l.h.s. of this equation is
strictly decreasing in ct. By Proposition 1, the r.h.s of this equation is strictly
increasing in ct. This immediately implies that n
∗
t is strictly decreasing in ct.
Because, by Proposition 1, q∗t is strictly increasing in γ, it is easy to show
that (24) implies that in equilibrium the term in (23) is strictly increasing
in γ. Therefore, the term in the bracket on the l.h.s. of equation (25) is
strictly decreasing in γ. By Proposition 1, the r.h.s of this equation is strictly
increasing in γ. This immediately implies that n∗t is strictly decreasing in γ.
The term in the bracket of the l.h.s. of equation (25) is strictly increasing
in d− k, because, by Proposition 1, q∗t is independent of d and k. Therefore,
(25) implies that n∗t is strictly decreasing in k and strictly increasing in d.
Finally, note that by (10) and (12), the zero profit condition can be
written as
(1− r)[x∗t ]
2 = K(q∗t ). (26)
Therefore, the comparative statics properties of x∗t and q
∗
t are identical, with
the exception of r. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: Results (i)–(iii) immediately follow from (20) and
the properties of ϕI(·) stated in Lemma 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Propositions 5 and 6: By Proposition 4, nˆ is uniquely deter-
mined by the steady state zero profit condition
(1− r)
(1 + nˆ)2
[d− k − cˆ]2 = K(γ). (27)
As cˆ is strictly increasing in γ, the term in the bracket on the l.h.s of this
equation is strictly decreasing in γ. Since the r.h.s is strictly increasing in γ,
it follows that nˆ is strictly decreasing in γ.
By Proposition 4, cˆ is independent of d and k. As the term in the bracket
on the l.h.s of equation (27) is strictly increasing in d − k, this implies that
nˆ is strictly decreasing in k and strictly increasing in d.
By Proposition 4, cˆ is strictly increasing in r. Thus the term in the bracket
of the l.h.s. of (27) is strictly decreasing in r. This in turn implies that nˆ is
strictly decreasing in r.
Finally, note that by (10) and (12), the zero profit condition in the steady
state can be written as
(1− r)xˆ2 = K(γ). (28)
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Therefore, xˆ is strictly increasing in γ and r and independent of the param-
eters k and d. Q.E.D.
Proof of Propositions 7 and 8: We first show that ct < cˆ implies ct < ct+1
for all t. Let q∗t = q
∗(ct) denote the equilibrium innovation rate in state ct.
By Proposition 1, q∗(c) is strictly increasing in c. As q∗(cˆ) = γ, ct < cˆ implies
q∗t = q
∗(ct) < γ. Therefore, (15) implies ct+1 > ct.
Next, we show that ct < cˆ implies ct+1 ≤ cˆ for all t. Note that the first
argument in the proof of Proposition 2 shows that
ct
1 + γ
1 + q∗(ct)
(29)
is strictly increasing in ct. Since ct < cˆ and q
∗(cˆ) = γ, this implies
ct+1 = ct
1 + γ
1 + q∗(ct)
< cˆ
1 + γ
1 + q∗(cˆ)
= cˆ. (30)
We have thus shown that ct > cˆ implies ct < ct+1 ≤ cˆ for all t. An
analogous argument completes the proof of the proposition by showing that
ct > cˆ implies ct > ct+1 ≥ cˆ for all t.
Finally, from (10) we have:
X∗t = x
∗
tn
∗
t = d− k − ct
1 + γ
1 + q∗t (ct)
− x∗t (31)
From (31) it is obvious that X∗t is decreasing over time when c0 < cˆ and
is increasing over time otherwise. This, in turn, implies that the industry’s
labor cost per unit of output,
(1− r)ct
1 + γ
1 + q∗t (ct)
+ r(d− k −X∗t )
is increasing over time when c0 < cˆ and is decreasing over time otherwise.
Q.E.D.
8 Appendix B: Dixit-Stiglitz Preferences
In this appendix, we extend our analysis to a differentiated industry and
confirm our main findings under an alternative specification of the demand
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function which has been extensively used in the literature and originates from
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). It has the important feature to reflect a preference
for product diversity. We show that the main properties of the steady state
equilibrium extend to this demand specification.8 In addition, we investigate
how the steady state depends on the preference for diversity.
The (representative) consumer’s utility is given by:
U(x0, x1, ..., xn) = x
1−δ
0 [x
ρ
1 + ...+ x
ρ
n]
δ/ρ, 0 < ρ < 1, 0 < δ < 1, (32)
where x0 is the quantity of the numeraire good, xi, i = 1, ..., n, is the quantity
of the differentiated good produced by firm i , δ is the share of the endowment
income that the consumer spends on the differentiated products, and ρ is the
degree of product substitutability. The higher is ρ, the closer substitutes the
products of the n firms are. Denoting by I the endowment income of the
consumer, and maximizing (32) subject to the consumer’s budget constraint
I = p0x0 +
∑n
i=1 pixi, with p0 normalized to 1, we obtain the (inverse)
demand function faced by each firm i:
pi =
δI
xi
(
xi
y
)ρ
, where y = [xρ1 + ...+ x
ρ
n]
1/ρ. (33)
Upon replacing the demand part in (9) by (33), we obtain the following
maximization problem for firm i when the state of the industry at date t is
given by ct:
max
xit,qit
(1− r)
[
δI
xit
(
xit
y
)ρ
− k − ct
1 + γ
1 + qit
]
xit −K(qit). (34)
Taking the first order conditions and assuming symmetry yields
(1− r)ct
1 + γ
(1 + q∗t )
x∗t = K
′(q∗t ); (35)
δIρ
n∗t − 1
n∗2t x
∗
t
= k + ct
1 + γ
1 + q∗t
. (36)
Finally, using (34), symmetry and (36), we obtain the zero-profit condition:
(1− r)
δI
n∗2t
[n∗t − ρ(n
∗
t − 1)] = K(q
∗
t ). (37)
8Numerical simulations suggest that the industry monotonically approaches the steady
state.
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In the steady state we have q∗t = qˆ = γ and so ct = cˆ, xt = xˆ, and nt = nˆ.
Therefore, (35), (36), and (37) can be rewritten in the following way:
(1− r)cˆxˆ = K ′(γ)(1 + γ); (38)
δIρ
nˆ− 1
nˆ2xˆ
= k + cˆ; (39)
(1− r)δI
nˆ− ρ(nˆ− 1)
nˆ2
= K(γ). (40)
By (40) there is a unique number of active firms nˆ in the steady state
and this number is strictly decreasing in γ and r. It is decreasing also in
the preference parameter ρ. When the firms’ products are closer substitutes,
competition becomes more intensive and so fewer firms enter the market.
However, now nˆ is independent of the cost of the capacity investments k
while with our initial specification it was decreasing in k. Also note that nˆ
is strictly increasing in the consumer’s expenditures δI.
Since for each level of the competitive wage growth γ there is a unique nˆ,
we reconfirm that there is also a unique xˆ and a unique cˆ. Indeed, from (39)
we have:
cˆxˆ+ kxˆ = δIρ
nˆ− 1
nˆ2
, (41)
and using (38), we obtain
xˆ =
1
k
[
δIρ
nˆ− 1
nˆ2
−
K ′(γ)(1 + γ)
1− r
]
. (42)
From (42) it follows that xˆ is strictly decreasing in k.
Finally, from (38) and (42), we get
cˆ =
K ′(γ)(1 + γ)k
(1− r)δIρ[(nˆ− 1)/nˆ2]−K ′(γ)(1 + γ)
. (43)
From inspection of (43) we conclude that cˆ is strictly increasing in k.
To characterize the effect of the preference parameter ρ on xˆ and cˆ we
note that ∂[(nˆ−1)/nˆ2]/∂n < 0 if and only if nˆ > 2. The latter is a reasonable
assumption in a market with monopolistic competition. We know from above
that nˆ is strictly decreasing in ρ. This, in turn, means that if nˆ > 2, the term
(nˆ−1)/nˆ2 that enters both in (42) and (43) is strictly increasing in ρ. Taking
this into account, as well as the first term in the brackets of (42), it follows
that xˆ is strictly increasing in ρ for nˆ > 2. Applying a similar reasoning to
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(43), we can also conclude that the reverse is true for cˆ, i.e. cˆ is strictly
decreasing in ρ if nˆ > 2. Thus, when products are closer substitutes there
are fewer and larger firms in the industry and these firms are more efficient
(i.e. lower cˆ).
Finally, in order to examine the impact of γ and r on x̂ and ĉ, we set
K(q) = m + sq2, with m, s > 0, and perform numerical simulations. The
latter indicate that an increase in the employees’ bargaining power r has a
positive impact on both x̂ and ĉ as with our initial specification. An increase
in γ continues to have a positive impact on ĉ, but it now has a negative
impact on x̂.
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